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CASE COMMENTS
Labor Relations-Court Enforcement of Union Fines
In 1959 and 1962 the United Auto Workers called strikes against
the Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Company's plants at La Crosse
and West Allis Wisconsin. During the strikes certain members of
the union crossed the picket lines and continued to work. The
union brought disciplinary actions against the strikebreakers by
fining them in amounts ranging from $20 to $100. Some of the
members refused to pay the fines and the union brought a test
suit in a state court to collect them. Judgment for the fine was
rendered in favor of the union. During the pendency of the state
court appeal from that judgment, Allis-Chalmers brought a com-
plaint before the National Labor Relations Board charging the
union with commission of unfair labor practices in violation of
section 8(b) (1) (A) of the National Labor Relations Act. The
Board dismissed the case on the ground that even if the union
action constituted coercion under section 8 (b) (1) (A) it was
excepted under the "Union Rules" proviso in the section. Allis-
Chalmers then filed a petition for review with the United States
Circuit Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.' The Court
reversed and held that the union had committed an unfair labor
practice. The Board then petitioned the United States Supreme
Court for a writ of certiorari. Held, reversed by 5-4 decision. The
imposition of a court enforceable fine is not an unfair labor practice
in violation of section 8(b) (1) (A) of the National Labor Relations
Act. National Labor Relations Board v. Allis-Chalmers Manufactur-
ing Company, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1123 (1967).
This decision represents an attempt to resolve a conflict between
section 8(b)(1)(A) of the National Labor Relations Act and
the proviso to that section. Section 8(b)(1) (A) provides:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or
its agents (1) to restrain or coerce (A) employees in the
exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7: Provided, That
this paragraph shall not impair the right of a labor organization
to prescribe its own rules with respect to the acquisition or
retention of membership therein.... 2
1358 F.2d 656 (7th Cir. 1966).
2 Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act), § (8) (b) (1) (A),
29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(A) (1964).
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In two recent cases the courts have upheld court enforcement of
union fines imposed to punish employees for an infraction of
internal discripline.3 In these two cases the courts relied somewhat
upon the "contract theory" to support their holdings. The essence
of the "contract theory" is that the relationship between the
employee and his union constitutes a contract which can be
judicially upheld. Previously the "contract theory" had been util-
ized, but not in actions concerning court enforcement of union
fines.4
In one of the recent cases5 a busdriver was fined for entering
a dispatcher's office and answering the telephone. The court held
that because such conduct was in violation of a union prohibition,
the fine related to purely internal affairs and could be enforced in
the courts.6 In UAW v. Woychik' a union member was fined for
crossing his union's picket line during a strike. There the court
upheld the validity of the fine on the ground that the constitution
and by laws of the union calling for such a fine constituted a con-
tract between the union and its members.
In those cases where the courts were unable to find an authoriza-
tion for a fine in the contract between the employee and the
union the enforcement of such fines has been denied. In United
Glass Workers' Local 188 v. Seitz8 a union member was fined for
violation of his agreement not to work behind a picket line. In
the contract there was no provision for enforcing the fine other than
suspension or expulsion. The court held that the fine could not be
enforced in a civil proceeding.'
In deciding the principal case, the Court partially relied upon
the "contract theory" although it was not the controlling factor.
3 Division 1478 of Amalgamated Ass'n of St., Elec., Ry. and Motor Coach
Employees of America v. Ross, 90 N.J. Super. 391, 392, 217 A.2d 883, 884
(1966); UAW Local 756 v. Woychik, 5 Wis. 2d 528, 530, 93 N.W.2d 336,
338-39 (1958).
4 Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617, 620 (1958);
Poole v. Natl Organization of Masters, Local 90, 55 Wash. 2d 504, 510, 348
P.2d 986, 990 (1960); UAW Local 261 v. Schulze, 3 Wis. 2d 479, 481, 89
N.W.2d 191, 194 (1958); Yeager v. Intl Bhd. of Teamsters, 39 Wash. 2d
807, 811, 239 P.2d 318 333 (1951).
' Division 1478 o Amalgamated Ass'n of St., Elec., Ry. and Motor Coach
Employees of America v. Ross, 90 N.J. Super., 391, 392, 217 A.2d 883, 884
(1966).
61d.
7 5 Wis. 2d 528, 93 N.W.2d 336 (1958).
8 65 Wash.2d 640, 399 P.2d 74 (1965).
9 Accord, Retail Clerks Local 629 v. Christiansen, 67 Wash. 2d 29, 406
P.2d 327 (1965).
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The Court recognized the fact that although the courts have been
reluctant to interfere with internal union affairs, they have none-
theless done so in order to uphold the provisions of the contract
between the employee and the union."°
The dissent contended that the Court had utilized the "contract
theory" to rationalize the vast difference between a fine enforced
through the union and a fine enforced in the court. It argued that
the "contract theory" is a legal fiction and that any imposition of
such a fine is without merit." The feeling of the dissent on the
validity of the "contract theory" was summarized: "[C]ongress
did not intend to insulate union coercion from the literal language
of § 8(b)(1)(A) merely because the union has secured a 'full'
but involuntary contract from those it desires to coerce."' 2
In the principal case, Allis-Chalmers had a union security clause
in their contract with the union which made it mandatory that
all company employees affiliate themselves with the union to the
extent of paying dues. Thus, there was no disagreement between
the majority opinion and the dissent over the fact that the em-
ployees had no choice but to join the union."
That a union security agreement cannot be used for any purpose
other than to compel the payment of union dues and fees was
pointed out by the dissent. This point is substantiated by the
Supreme Court decision in Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB,'4 in
which the Court held that section 8(b)(2)5 prohibits a union
from forcing an employer to discharge an employee for failure to
pay a fine. The Court further held in Radio Officers' Union v.
0NLBv. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 18 L. Ed. 2d 1123. 1129 (1967).
"1Id. at 1143 n. 6. The dissent quoted from Summers, Legal Limitations
on Union Discipline, 64 H~Av. L. Rzv. 1049, 1055-56 (1951):
The contract of membership is ... a legal fabrication . . what are
the terms of the contract? The constitutional provisions . . . are
so notoriously vague that they fall short of the certainty ordinarily.
required of a contract. The member has no choice as to terms but
is compelled to adhere to the inflexible ones presented .... [T]he
union . . . retains the unlimited power to amend any terms at any
time.... In short, membership is a special relationship. It is as far
removed from the main channel of contract law as the relationship
created by marriage..
,2NLRB v AiiUs-Chahiers Mfg. Co., 18 L. Ed. 2d 1123, 1143 (1967).
'3 Id. at 1147.
14347 U.S. 17, 41 (1953).
'- Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § (8) (b) (2), 29
U.S.C. § 158(b)(2) (1964):
It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its
agents (2) to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate
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NLRB'" that a union shop clause could be used only to compel
payment of "periodic dues and initiation fees." Thus the dissent
in the principal case reasoned that by resorting to the courts to
collect the fines, the union had placed its conduct in direct
opposition to the Supreme Court's interpretation of the section 717
union shop authorization.
The fact that the employees had failed to prove that they
enjoyed anything other than full union membership was the basis
for the Court's finding that the employees were not limited to the
sole obligation of paying dues. In taking issue with this contention,
the dissent pointed out that few if any employees were aware of the
fact that they would have to limit their membership in order to
avoid the punishment of court ordered fines.'8 It also pointed out
that even those employees who would be willing to acquire only
a limited membership would not know how to do so.'
In reaching its decision, the Court relied heavily on the legisla-
tive history of the Taft-Hartley Act. It attempted to point out that
the use of court enforced fines was never specifically prohibited
in the Act itself nor in the legislative testimony and discussion
which preceded it. In developing its argument, the Court placed
great emphasis on the fact that the debates and testimony preced-
ing the passage of section 8(b)(1)(A) contained not a single
word referring to any prohibitive effect on "traditional internal
union discipline."2" The Court pointed out that the sponsors of
against an employee is violation of subsection (a)(3) or to dis-
criminate against an employee with respect to whom membership
in such organization has been denied or terminated on some ground
other than his failure to tender the periodic dues and the initation
fees uniformly required as a condition of acquiring or retaining mem-
bership.
16 347 U.S. 17 (1953).
17 Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 7, 29 U.S.C.
§ 157 (1964):
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join,
or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through repre-
sentatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted
activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual
aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any
or all such activities except to the extent that such right may be
affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organiza-
tion as a condition of employment as authorized in section 8(a)(3).
18 NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 18 L. Ed. 2d 1123, 1147 (1967).
19 Id.
20 The dissent took issue with this point. It contended that in 1947
court enforced fines were neither traditional nor common-place. It reasoned
that Congress was unfamiliar with such innovations as court enforced fines
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the bill assured the Congress that section 8(b) (1) (A) was not
meant to regulate the internal affairs of the union.2" The Court
supported its interpretation by pointing out that the internal union
affairs regulations came in the Landrum-Griffin Act in 1959 after
section 8 (b) (1) was enacted in 1947.
The Court also noted that when Senator Pepper expressed fear
that section 8(b) (2) might allow federal intervention into internal
union affairs, he was reassured by Senator Taft that the proposed
section would not limit the union in this respect. Senator Taft went
on to explain that a union would still be allowed to discipline its
own members.22 The only conduct, he explained, to be prohibited
after the enactment of the bill would be that a union would not
be allowed to cause an employer to discharge an employee for
any reason other than for non-payment of union dues. 3 Thus
the Court stated that since section 8(b) (2) "insulated an employee's
membership from his job,"" it left the union free to discipline its
members. According to the Court's reasoning, the statement of
purpose outlined by Senator Taft was clear evidence that section
8(b) (1) (A) did not prohibit the union from using fines to dis-
cipline its members. This idea followed the premise that since
the proviso to section 8(b)(1) (A) allows the union to prescribe
its own rules in maintaining membership, the union will also be
allowed to expel its members for breaking its rules.
In reaching its decision the Court took certain matters of policy
into consideration. It recognized the fact that the union's strength
is derived from its ability to bargain collectively. It also pointed
out that if the union is to sustain its strength in this area, it is
imperative that it be allowed to maintain discipline within its
ranks. This is especially true with respect to a validly called strike,
a union's most effective and most protected weapon. The majority
undoubtedly felt that any rules and regulations which protected
this union weapon were reasonable. It is then not too difficult
to go one step further and say that court enforcement of fines
levied for violation of reasonable union rules and regulations is
not coercion.
and that their failure to distinguish between internally enforced and court
enforced fines could not support the premise that Congress in 1947 "was un-
concerned with the .means' used to enforce its fines." NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers
Mfg. Co., 18 L. Ed. 2d 1123, 1142 (1967).
21 Id. at 1131.
22 93 CONG. REc. 4193 (1947) (remarks of Senator Taft).
23 Id.
2 4 NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 18 L. Ed. 2d 1123, 1130 (1967).
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If this case stands for the proposition that section 8(b)(1)(A)
cannot be used to regulate activities of unions against members,
as it appears to do, then it is a unique interpretation which may
have far-reaching effects.
By this decision, the union has gained a new source of strength
and the employee has lost a great measure of his freedom to
refrain from engaging in concerted union activities. The decision
has the effect of placing in the hands of the union a powerful
weapon which may be used to enforce their will upon the em-
ployee. Henceforth, the court enforced fine will no doubt deter
a great deal of rebellion within the inner ranks of the union. It
will certainly strengthen the union in its struggle against manage-
ment. It may even have the long range effect of winning more
benefits for the worker. But the worker may find that these new
benefits are a poor substitute for the loss of individual freedom
which he will suffer because of this decision.
Thomas M. Chattin
Legislation-Validity of Special Acts When
A General Law Already Exists
The West Virginia Legislature passed a special act authorizing
the Greenbrier County Court to create an airport authority to
construct, maintain, and operate an airport. An airport authority
was created and construction of an airport begun. To finance the
construction of the airport, the airport authority authorized the
sale of revenue bonds. The Secretary of the airport authority was
the only officer empowered to sign the certificate authorizing the
sale of the bonds; he refused to do so. The airport authority brought
an original proceeding in mandamus to compel its Secretary to
sign the certificate. Prior to this a citizen of Greenbrier County
had instituted a civil action to have the act declared unconstitu-
tional as contrary to article VI section 39 of the West Virginia
Constitution. The trial court declared the special act valid. Held,
reversed, writ denied. The existence of a general law relating to
airports indicates that the Legislature recognizes that a general
law is applicable to the subject. Therefore, since there is no
doubt that a general law is applicable, the necessity for a special
act is precluded, and the special act is void. The Legislature could
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